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d'ARGE AND HUNT ON EXTERNALITIES 
AND ECONOMIC ORTHODOXY: 
A CRITIQUE APPRAISED 
By William W. Brown and Morgan Reynolds':' 
In a recent issue of this Journal/ R. C. d'Arge and E. K. Hunt 
present a "critique" of the conventional economic analysis con-
cerning external effects. After convincing themselves that "unless 
economics radically reorients its entire frame of reference" no 
progress is possible in "understanding and resolving the social 
and economic problem of environmental pollution and degrada-
tion," they unveil "a very crude road map toward reorientation." 
We suggest that the marketplace in economic ideas is rather like 
other markets-i t pays to be wary of assertions by anxious sellers. 
A patient investigation of the sellers' claims is often rewarded, 
and in this spirit of caveat emptor we propose to subject their seg-
ments to a skeptical inquiry. 
Lest our sympathies be misunderstood at the outset, we admit 
that we too agonize over the fact that human wants exceed the 
ability to satisfy them, that mother nature did not create a world 
of our choosing and that people do not always act with our inter-
est in mind. However, the discrepancy between the way the world 
is, and the way we wish it to be, is not a generally accepted vehicle 
for carrying the day in matters economic. On the contrary, eco-
nomics, if it is a positive science at all, concerns the development 
of a consistent theoretical structure designed to explain and pre-
dict an extensive class of observable behavior, not to pass on the 
desirability of such behavior. 
The traditional method for displacing theories in the empirical 
sciences is to supply an alternative logical framework with a 
richer spectrum of refutable implications about the world. To 
quote a higher authority, Albert Einstein writes, "A theory is the 
more impressive the greater the simplicity of its premises is, the 
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more different kinds of things it relates, and the more extended is 
its area of applicability. "2 Although general theories are "wholly" 
displaced in only the rarest of revolutionary instances, they are 
gradually and continuously modified through marginal extensions 
developed in the resolution of specific problems. Modifications of 
existing theory provide infinite avenues for extending our positive 
economic knowledge of behavior. 
If this be gran ted as the basis for toppling or modifying a the-
ory, how do our protagonists measure up? What are the alleged 
weaknesses of "orthodox" economies? Do d'Arge and Hunt pro-
vide a more powerful framework for analyzing behavior? Is there 
empirical evidence for the predictive success of their alternative? 
What is the basis of their critique? 
Apparently, mundane questions about the empirical success or 
failure of economic analysis is of no concern for d'Arge and Hunt. 
Rather, economic orthodoxy is "vulnerable on psychological and 
ethical grounds."3 Perhaps we are simply ignorant of the new 
standards for evaluating theories, but we would like to know how 
a theory yielding empirically refutable implications is vulnerable 
on psychological and ethical grounds. Can you imagine the reac-
tion of a Newton, Galileo, Boyle, Mendel, or Leaky to the charge 
that their theories were vulnerable on psychological and ethical 
grounds? That their "entire normative framework" was partially 
defective? Perhaps d'Arge and Hunt are unwilling to admit to a 
corpus of positive economic knowledge. We do not know. 
Much of their critique rests on a peculiar understanding of the 
results of economic theory. For example, they assert, "The con-
ventional intellectual tradition in economic theory covering at 
least the last two hundred years rests squarely upon hedonistic 
preconceptions."4 According to Webster's New World Dictionary, 
hedonism is the doctrine that pleasure is the principal good. Yet 
the predictive success of economics is based upon the denial of 
some immutable principal good. Men will substitute (or trade-off) 
among goods depending upon relative costs and benefits. Hence 
the ability to explain why much of mankind spends Saturday 
morning picking weeds and mowing lawns-a distinctly unplea-
surable activity, at least for the authors. Similarly, the success in 
explaining why charity expands rapidly after catastrophes rests 
upon trade-offs. 6 Nowhere in contemporary economics is "hedon-
ism" the dominant force in molding behavior-and rightly so, 
since the real world would quickly refute such naive assertions. 
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To confuse the observation that people prefer more goods to less 
with something termed "hedonism" is plainly wrong. Economics 
does not specify what things are goods, whether they may be 
brotherly love, your neighbor's welfare, help for the poor, a weed-
less lawn, or pecuniary wealth, but only that people behave in 
predictable ways to changes in the relative costs and benefits of 
goods. 
Another instance of their peculiarly distorted view of economics 
is that external effects have received casual and/or little attention 
by economists. They contend that "the treatment of externalities 
in economics, even in many recent theoretical analyses, borders 
on the notion that externalities are 'freakish anomalies easily 
adjusted for within an otherwise perfectly functioning competi-
tive system.' "6 If this be true, how do they account for the flood 
of articleson thesubject since, say, 1954when Samuelson published 
"The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure."7 Certainly since 
Coase's "The Problem of Social Cost"s in 1960, the widespread 
literature on externalities would seem to indicate a "pervasive" 
concern over these "freakish anomalies." 
Perhaps economic investigations of information and transac-
tion costs, alternative property right assignments, and uncer-· 
tainty, all of which bear on the extent to which externalities are 
"problems," are yielding results which they do not like. Perhaps 
they are simply impatient with the progress to date, in which case 
we can only agree and join in urging further work. 
Their suggestion that government (presumably economists as 
well) view the "pollution problem not as one of millions of firms 
and individuals, each requiring adjustments but as a problem of 
the society as a whole"9 has a nice ring of workability about it. 
Nothing like seeing the big picture, especially when mere mortals 
like us are yet unable to precisely define the "problem." Can we 
expect that the "societal viewpoint" will yield useful propositions 
about the behavior of people in the presence of external effects, 
how they adjust their behavior to induce others to generate more 
or less of a given externality? Or explain the development of 
"planned" communities and how developers internalize the ex-
ternalities associated with community living? Or why diverse 
retailers locate in the same area? Or how firms organize to mi ti-
gate external effects arising in production? Or under what condi-
tions administrative actions are a lower cost substitute for market 
exchanges? Despite the best of intentions, the "society as a 
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whole" approach falls rather short of an operational framework 
for analyzing externalities. 
In their drive to develop the "necessity of a change in eco-
nomic viewpoint," d'Arge and Hunt point out that the real world 
is a complicated place. Though not a new observation, they de-
scribe it with an engaging phrase-"pervasive externalities." 
Recognizing that the actions of an individual, in addition to hav-
ing private consequences, almost always affect others, they are 
troubled by the lack of organized markets where trades in exter-
nal effects could be consummated. In fact they offer this apparent 
lack of quid-pro-quo market exchanges as evidence of weakness in 
orthodox economic theory. 
There is no doubt that the side effects of our actions, pervasive 
as they are, are intriguing and pose the difficult question of deter-
mining what institutional arrangements are low cost ways of re-
ducing their relevance. But the absence of an organized market 
cannot, on its face, be considered non-economic (i.e., inefficient) 
nor an indictment of economic theory. In fact it should be obvious 
that markets are viable only when the benefits perceived by 
transactors outweigh the cost of organizing and operating the 
market. Consequently it is not surprising that there are not active 
markets in belching rights, nor rights to pollute the air via auto-
mobile exhaust. 
What do d'Arge and Hunt propose as a means of analyzing the 
imagined problem of the "pervasiveness" of externalities? Do 
they give us a means for assessing administrative versus non-
administrative modes of mitigating external effects? Do they tell 
us about the "external effects" of governmentally imposed solu-
tions? Do they give us insight into how different institutional 
arrangements will induce different flows of information? Presum-
ably these are questions of some concern. Unfortunately the mere 
recognition of the world's complicated nature is not sufficient for 
viable analysis. 
Another matter which apparently concerns d'Arge and Hunt 
is the lack of correspondence between the "restrictive assump-
tions" of economics and the real world. We wonder if they are 
equally concerned about the effect of assuming a perfect vacuum 
upon the ability to predict the flight of a cannon ball. Do the 
"unrealistic" models of molecular structure prevent a chemist 
from predicting that combining hydrogen and oxygen yields 
water? Does the assumption of negatively sloped demand curves 
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yield tolerably accurate predictions about the results of minimum 
wage or ren t con trol laws? 
On the matter of "restrictive assumptions" we applaud the 
reference to J. de V. Graaff's book, but not our protagonists' 
interpretation.Io The first sentence of Graaff's chapter 10 reads: 
"The measure of acceptance the marginal cost pricing principle 
has won among professional economists would be astonishing were 
not its pedigree so long and respectable."ll In their eagerness to 
"devastate" economic orthodoxy, d'Arge and Hunt use the 
quoted passage in the following fashion: "Many of them are so 
restrictive that one must agree with Graaff that 'the measure of 
acceptance ... [which this theory] has won among professional 
economists would be astonishing were not its pedigree so long and 
respectable."12 Note their substitution of "this theory" for "mar-
ginal cost pricing." To equate marginal cost pricing with all of 
economic orthodoxy and to assert that Graaff led "one of the 
most devastating attacks" on economic theory is a credit to their 
imagination but nothing more. Graaff was concerned with speci-
fying the assumptions which are sufficient to allow an economist 
to prescribe, for a public enterprise or nationalized industry, set-
ting price equal to marginal cost. Graaff demonstrates that econ-
omists cannot recommend or make policy statements about what 
allocation or prices ought to be. Such analysis leads Graaff to 
conclude his book: 
I do feel very strongly that the greatest contribution that economics 
is likely to make to human welfare, broadly conceived, is through 
positive studies-through contributing to our understanding of how 
the economic system actually works in practice ... In my view the 
job of economists is not to reach welfare conclusions for others, but 
rather to make available positive knowledge-the information and 
the understanding-on the basis of which laymen (and economists 
themselves; out of office hours) can pass judgment.13 
Graaff's message is strikingly similar to that of Milton Fried-
man who stresses that normative economics cannot be inde-
pendent of positive economics because any policy conclusion 
necessarily rests upon some positive analysis about why a prob-
lem exists and therefore how the recommendation will ameliorate 
it. Friedman adds: 
I venture the judgment, however, that currently in the Western 
world, and especially in the United States, differences about eco-
nomic policy among disinterested citizens derive predominantly from 
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different predictions about the economic consequences of taking ac-
tion-differences that in principle can be eliminated by the progress 
of positive economics-rather than from fundamental differences in 
basic values, differences about which men can ultimately only fight. l4 
d'Arge and Hunt warn that "attempts by the government to 
bring about 'workable competition' may result in effects diametri-
cally opposed by those envisioned by the authors of those poli-
cies."15 Admirable advice. To what extent does their "radical 
reorientation" conform to the prescription? What, in fact, are 
their specific proposals to "ameliorate the effect of waste emis-
sions"? Three policies are suggested-changes in macroeconomic 
policy to reduce waste generation, imposition of a family expendi-
ture limit, and finally, subsidies to encourage "environmental 
awareness and an encompassing conservation ethic." What will 
be the effects of these schemes? 
Using macroeconomic policy to achieve environmental goals 
seems a blunt instrument at best. What they hope to achieve with 
particular changes seems murkier yet. We agree there are con-
ceivable effects on waste emissions from governmental policies, 
but we find it somewhat unsatisfactory that the particular effects 
go unexplained. For exam pIe, we are puzzled by the con ten tion that 
the production of investment goods does not generate wastes but 
consumption goods do. What possible evidence could they offer? 
We also are told that tax credits, depletion allowances and capital 
gains provisions have consequences for the generation of wastes. 
Was the matter ever in doubt? What these effects are in specific 
instances however, is not so easily discovered. The oil depletion 
allowance, for instance, encourages more resource use in oil pro-
duction but in what alternative activity would these resources 
have been used? More (or less) waste may be generated in the 
alternative use. Again, no evidence is presented. Low depreciation 
allowances are claimed to reduce waste by increasing the age of 
the capital stock, but this relationship is doubtful, as is the rela-
tionship between depreciation rates and the age of equipment. 
Among blunt instruments however, the maximum limit on 
family expenditure is the most ill-conceived of all. What empirical 
evidence supports this proposal? Are family expenditures on 
goods "after" the first $20,000 more pollution intensive than if the 
goods were purchased by the poor? There is no evidence, but it 
seems most improbable. Other predictable consequences of such 
a policy are ignored. For example, competing employers will re-
sort to non-salary inducements to attract skilled labor. "Fringe 
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benefits" will grow into homes and cars and country club mem-
berships. Barter generally will expand at the expense of money 
~xchanges, as high income units attempt to reduce reportable 
incomes. 
Other adjustments will occur. Family units will split off and 
multiply to avoid the impact of an expenditure ceiling. More and 
more resources will be consumed on moni toring and policing these 
arrangements, although the authors seem less concerned here 
about "private freedom" than in the case of monitoring automo-
bile emissions. Further questions arise. Could a family redistribute 
consumption over time in order to spend more than $20,000 this 
year and less than $20,000 next year? Or do not personal prefer-
ences matter? Could persons above the ceiling negotiate a mutu-
ally agreeable exchange by buying some of the "unused" con-
sumption rights from an individual below the ceiling? The entire 
proposal, even if "successfully" implemented beyond the authors' 
fondest dreams, has an unknown impact on the total waste flow. 
We suspect it is proposed simply to redistribute income, but if so, 
let this redistributive device rise or fall on its relative distribu-
tional merits, not on its presumed "environmental consequences." 
The last proposal to reduce wastes "evolves from a simple idea" 
but could better be termed simple-minded. d'Arge and Hunt call 
for a doctrine of cooperation and conservation, an encompassing 
conservation ethic, a less extravagant existence. Noble sentiments 
indeed. Organized religions have peddled such messages for cen-
turies without notable impact on human behavior. We find it 
amusing that two economists place confidence in "social con-
sciousness" but not in taxing emissions or assigning private prop-
erty rights to unowned resources like air and water. Should we 
presume that firms struggling to show a profit will not cheat on 
the "conservation ethic" and pollute just a little bit? Even if all 
present firms in an industry "behave," what prevents some ill-
intentioned, profit-seeking soul from starting a firm with no 
pollution control? The conservation ethic? Community disap-
proval? The same forces, no doubt, account for the lack of prosti-
tutes, dope-peddlers, pornographers and napalm manufacturers. 
d'Arge and Hunt must recognize that resources are consumed in 
an "educational" effort so they must believe that preaching will 
reduce wastes more than using the same resources on the next 
best policy. We doubt it. Molding men's souls to "do good" does 
not promise high returns. 
A previous exchange between a pair of distinguished econo-
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mists, Robert Solow and John Galbraith, comes to mind. I6 Solow 
drew a distinction between big-thinkers and little-thinkers. Econ-
omists generally fall in the latter category, being small-minded 
types who keep insisting upon tight reasoning which yields em-
pirically refutable implications. Perhaps our small-mindedness 
has blinded us to the moral vision of big-thinkers, but we await 
further revelation. Meanwhile, until contrary evidence accumu-
lates, we shall continue to presume that an enlightened morality 
is not necessary for the understanding of economic behavior. 
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